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Abstract
Digraphs provide an alternative syntax for propositional logic, with digraph kernels cor-
responding to classical models. Semikernels generalize kernels and we identify a subset of
well-behaved semikernels that provides nontrivial models for inconsistent theories, specializ-
ing to the classical semantics for the consistent ones. Direct (instead of refutational) reasoning
with classical resolution is sound and complete for this semantics, when augmented with a
specific weakening which, in particular, excludes Ex Falso. Dropping all forms of weakening
yields reasoning which also avoids typical fallacies of relevance.
1 Introduction
Numerous approaches to paraconsistency seem to agree on one thing: modifications of the classical
logic, made to avoid explosion in the face of inconsistency, should be as limited as possible.
We provide a paraconsistent semantics and reasoning satisfying this objective in an unusually
strong sense: models and consequences of consistent theories are exactly their classical models
and consequences, while reasoning applies only classical resolution. Following [4, 3], we give an
equivalent formulation of propositional syntax as digraphs and of classical semantics as digraph
kernels, which are generalized to semikernels. Semikernels underlie a uniform, general concept of
a model, which gives classical models for consistent theories as a special case. For each theory,
this general concept yields a unique set of atoms involved into inconsistency, which is empty when
the theory is consistent.
The new semantics is the main contribution of the paper. Its significance is supported further
by some informal justification as well as the fact that classical resolution provides sound and
complete reasoning. Paraconsistency of direct (instead of refutational) resolution was applied in
[10] to infinitary logic. However, that work lacked the semantic counterpart which is now provided.
Direct resolution, applied here to finitary (usual) propositional logic, deviates from refutational
resolution primarily by the exclusion of Ex Falso. The graph syntax we use, expressed in the
language of clauses, makes Ex Falso a special case of weakening. An appropriate adjustment of
weakening prevents then explosion from a contradiction, allowing for its unrestricted applicability
when the theory is consistent.
Section 2 presents the background from [3, 10], explaining the applicability of digraphs as
propositional syntax, their kernels as classical models, and semikernels as a generalization of
kernels. Section 3 presents the main contribution: a semantics defined in terms of well-behaved
semikernels, assigning a nonempty set of models to every theory and specializing to the classical
semantics for consistent theories. The main theorem 3.10 shows that every inconsistent theory
has a unique set of bad atoms, contributing to inconsistency. The consequence relation also
specializes to the classical consequence for consistent theories. Unlike most formalisms, but in
agreement with the natural tendency of informal discourse, it disregards inconsistent parts of
statements whenever it is possible to extract from them also meaningful elements, to which truth-
values can be consistently assigned. Section 4 shows soundness and completeness of resolution
with appropriate weakening rules. Section 5 identifies elements of relevance reasoning and their
semantics, arising when resolution is used without any form of weakening.
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2 Digraphs as propositional syntax
A propositional formula is in graph normal form, GNF, when it has the form
x↔
∧
i∈[nx]
¬yi, (2.1)
where all x, yi are atoms (propositional variables), nx ∈ ω and [n] = {1, ..., n}. When nx = 0, the
corresponding formula is x. A theory is in GNF if all formulae are in GNF, and every atom of
the theory occurs exactly once unnegated, i.e., on the left of ↔.1 As an example we will use the
formalization ∆, to the right, of the discourse to the left. The statement (a) requires introduction
of a fresh atom a′, to conform to GNF:
a′ ↔ ¬a
(a) This statemenet is not false. a ↔ ¬a′
(b) The previous and the next statement are false. b ↔ ¬a ∧ ¬c
(c) The next statement is false. c ↔ ¬d
(d) The next statement is false. d ↔ ¬e
(e) Statement (c) is false. e ↔ ¬c
(2.2)
GNF is indeed a normal form: every theory in (infinitary) propositional logic has an equisatisfiable
one in GNF, [3] (new variables are typically needed to obtain GNF, as a′ above). The classical
semantics is defined in the usual way.
GNF allows a natural reading of its equivalences as propositional instances of the T-schema,
expressing that the atom x is true if and only if what it says,
∧
i∈[nx]
¬yi, is true. Taken in
this light, a theory in GNF represents a collection of T-schemata for the actual statements with
possible, also indirect, self-references. We therefore call a theory in GNF a discourse and define
paradox as an inconsistent discourse. Plausibility of this definition, implicit in [4], was argued and
exemplified in [6, 10] and is witnessed by the increasing popularity of the corresponding graph
representation in the analysis of paradoxes, [2, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10].2
Theories in GNF and graphs are namely easily transformed into each other. A graph (meaning
here “directed graph”, unless qualified otherwise) is a pair G = 〈G,AG〉 with AG ⊆ G × G.
(Overloading the notation G, for a graph and its set of vertices, should not cause any confusion.)
We denote AG(x) = {y ∈ G | AG(x, y)}, A−G (x) = {y ∈ G | x ∈ AG(y)}, and extend pointwise such
notation to sets, i.e., A−
G
(X) =
⋃
x∈X A
−
G
(x), etc. A∗
G
/A
∗
G denote reflexive, transitive closure of
AG/A
−
G
.
A GNF theory Γ gives a graph G with all atoms as vertices and edges from every x on the left
side of its GNF formula to each yi on its righ side, i.e., AG = {〈x, yi〉 | x ∈ G, i ∈ [nx]}. The graph
for ∆ from (2.2) is:
D : a′
// aoo boo // c // d // e.vv (2.3)
Conversely, the theory of a graph 〈G,A〉 is T (G) = {x ↔
∧
y∈A(x)¬y | x ∈ G}. (When x is a
sink, A(x) = ∅, this becomes x ↔ ⊤, i.e., x is included in T (G).) The two are inverses, so we
ignore usually the distinction between theories (in GNF) and graphs, viewing them as alternative
presentations.
The equivalence of graphs and GNF theories is not only a syntactic transformation. The
classical models of GNF theories can be defined equivalently as kernels of the corresponding
graphs, [4, 3]. A kernel of a graph G is a subset K ⊆ G which is independent (no edges between
vertices in K) and absorbing its complement (every y ∈ G \K has an edge to some x ∈ K), i.e.,
such that A−
G
(K) = G \K. Ker(G) denotes kernels of G.
1The formula a ↔ ¬b is in GNF but the theory {a ↔ ¬b} is not, due to the loose b. Such cases can be treated
as abbreviations, here, with a fresh atom b′ and two additional formulae b↔ ¬b′ and b′ ↔ ¬b.
2GNF finds also another application in argumentation theory in its AI-variant following [5]. In that context,
our notion of the (maximal) consistent subdiscourse amounts to a new semantics based on admissible sets, whereby
the acceptable extensions are the stable sets of the maximally consistent subdiscourse of the original digraph
(argumentation framework).
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Kernel of a graph G can be defined equivalently as a 2-partition α = 〈α1, α0〉 of the vertices
G, such that ∀x ∈ G :
(a) x ∈ α1 ⇔ ∀y ∈ AG(x) : y ∈ α0
(b) x ∈ α0 ⇔ ∃y ∈ AG(x) : y ∈ α1.
(2.4)
A 2-partition α satisfies (2.4) iff α1 ∈ Ker(G). On the other hand, satisfaction of (2.4) at
every x ∈ G is equivalent to the satisfaction of the respective GNF theory Γ = T (G). So, for
corresponding graph G and theory Γ, we identify also kernels of the former and models of the
latter. In short, graphs provide syntax for propositional logic, while their kernels are its classical
semantics.
CMod(Γ) denotes classical models of Γ, each represented as a partition α = 〈α1, α0〉 of G,
where α1/α0 are atoms assigned 1/0. The classical satisfaction, |=c, is obtained by the standard
extension to complex formulae of the basis for atoms a ∈ G : 〈α1, α0〉 |=c a iff a ∈ α
1 and
〈α1, α0〉 |=c ¬a iff a ∈ α0. C is a classical consequence of Γ, Γ |=c C if ∀α ∈ CMod(Γ) : α |=c C.
The exact correspondence between kernels of G and models of the respective theory Γ is as
follows: 3
CMod(Γ) = {〈α1, α0〉 ∈ P(G)× P(G) | α1 ∈ Ker(G), α0 = A−
G
(α1)}. (2.5)
Conditions (a) and (b) of (2.4) are equivalent for total α (with α0 = G \ α1), but we will also
consider more general structures, arising from the notion of a semikernel, [8], namely, a subset
S ⊆ G satisfying:
AG(S)
(a)
⊆ A−
G
(S)
(b)
⊆ G \ S. (2.6)
By (a), each x ∈ G with an edge from S has an edge back to S and, by (b), S is independent.
SK(G) denotes all semikernels of G. A semikernel S is a kernel of the induced subgraph A−
G
[S] =
A−
G
(S) ∪ S. (An induced subgraph, or a subgraph induced by H ⊆ G is H = 〈H,AG ∩ (H ×H)〉.)
Example 2.7 The graph D from (2.3) possess no kernel, as can be seen trying to assign values
at {c, d, e} conforming to (2.4). Its induced subgraph {c, d, e} does not even possess a semikernel,
but the whole graph D possesses two, namely, α1 = {a} and β1 = {a′}.
A semikernel can be defined equivalently as a 3-partition α = 〈α1, α0, α⊥〉 of G such that ∀x ∈ G :
(a) x ∈ α1 ⇒ ∀y ∈ AG(x) : y ∈ α0 AG(α1) ⊆ α0
(b) x ∈ α0 ⇔ ∃y ∈ AG(x) : y ∈ α1 α0 = A−G (α
1)
(c) x ∈ α⊥ ⇔ x ∈ G \ (α1 ∪ α0) α⊥ = G \ (α1 ∪ α0).
(2.8)
A 3-partition α satisfies (2.8) iff α1 is a semikernel. α1 is a kernel iff α1 is a semikernel and
α⊥ = ∅.
3 Semantics of inconsistency
Models of an arbitrary theory, i.e., of a graph possibly without any kernel, are required to satisfy
three conditions which we now briefly motivate.
In the graph D from (2.3), the subgraph induced by {c, d, e} has no semikernel, but the
subgraph induced by {a′, a, b} – the meaningful subdiscourse – has two kernels: α1 = {a} and
β1 = {a′, b}. The latter does not seem adequate as a model, because it should function in the
context of the whole original theory, and not only after removal of its inconsistent part. In the
context of the whole D, b negates not only a but also c, so to conform to (2.4), or even just (2.8),
b ∈ β1 would require c ∈ β0. Choosing α1 instead, b ∈ α0 complies with (2.8) since a ∈ AD(b)∩α
1.
This suggests semikernels as a semantic basis in the presence of inconsistency: α1 ∈ SK(D),
while β1 6∈ SK(D). A semikernel α1 makes all x ∈ α1 fully justfied, in the sense that AG(x) ⊆
3Sufficient conditions for absence of paradox, expressed in terms of the properties of the graph representing the
discourse, can be thus imported from kernel theory, as illustrated in [6]. They confirm that the liar, as a minimal
odd cycle, is the paradigmatic pattern of a finitary paradox: a finitely branching graph without odd cycles has a
kernel. For the infinitary case, it is natural to conjecture that one also has to exclude some form of a Yablo pattern.
Such a generalization is proposed in [11] and, in an equivalent formulation, in [2]. The proof of its special case in
[11] demonstrates the difficulty of the problem.
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α0. This excludes β1 from possible models. For x ∈ α0, on the other hand, it suffices that
AG(x) ∩ α1 6= ∅, allowing other out-neighbours of x to be arbitrary – possibly paradoxical. Such
paradoxical elements form the third part α⊥ of the model.
There are, however, too many semikernels. In the graphD, each among {a}, {a′} and ∅ (giving
α1 = α0 = ∅ and α⊥ = D) is a semikernel. Such a semantics is too liberal and we have to choose
semikernels more carefully.
To explain next restriction, it will be helpful to consider two simple examples. “This statement
is false and the sun is not a star” is represented by F1: f
%% // s. Here, f seems false, negating
the true statement s. Indeed, F1 has a unique kernel, α
1 = {s}, which yields f ∈ α0 = F1 \ α1.
Now, consider “This statement is false and the sun is a star” – represented by F2: f
%% // y // s.
Now f appears to be paradoxical, since F2 is a contingent liar, ceasing to be paradoxical only if
the sun is not a star, which it is. The only semikernel of F2, α
1 = {s}, gives α0 = {y}, but this
leads to the irresolvability of the paradox “at” f . In short, f is paradoxical because s happens to
be true. Hence, also s is involved in the paradox at f , not as a standalone atom but as a member
of the formula for y, which in turn features in the formula of the contingently paradoxical f .
The paradox “at” f – “referring to” s by denying y – involves s and y as much as it involves
self-reference. If we are not prepared to admit this, we should hardly regard F1 as nonparadoxical,
since the problematic self-reference at f is exactly the same in both F1 and F2. If the truth of s
prevents paradox in F1 then, in the same way, it contributes to it in F2.
This is not to suggest that “the sun is a star” is paradoxical on its own, only that its token
contributes to the paradoxical whole when combined with the contingent liar as in F2. Consis-
tency and paradox are genuinely holistic. Or put differently: the token of “the sun is a star” is
unproblematic in F1, but its token in F2 becomes paradoxical by contributing to the appearance of
the paradox: if there were no s, there would be no paradox. When trying to repair this paradox,
removing the loop at f is as good as removing s.
The absence of any single culprit among {f, y, s} is just as it was with {c, d, e} in (2.2). A
nonobvious informal lesson could be: if an inconsistency, occurring “at” some f , depends on some
s (in the sense of s ∈ A∗
G
(f)), then s is “a part of” this inconsistency. Consequently, we should not
rest satisfied with an arbitrary semikernel, like {s} ∈ SK(F2). Exactly the semikernel we choose
(combined with other factors, like the loop at f) can be the reason for the inconsistency, which
could be possibly prevented by another choice. A satisfactory semikernel S should not contribute
to any inconsistency occuring above it in the graph. Put precisely, a model is not only a semikernel
but an A−
G
-closed semikernel, i.e.:
S ∈ SK(G) : A−
G
(A−
G
[S]) ⊆ A−
G
[S]. (3.1)
This views all {f, y, s} as inconsistent (contributing to the inconsistency) in F2, making the empty
semikernel the only interpretation. For D from (2.3), the semikernel {a′} is rejected, as it is not
A−
G
-closed, leaving only {a}.
The above condition still admits the empty semikernel, even when there are nonempty ones.
To avoid this we require A−
G
[S] to be maximal:
∀R ⊆ G : R satsfies (3.1)⇒ A−G [S] 6⊂ A
−
G [R]. (3.2)
This condition can be seen as a minimization of inconsistencies, typical for preferential models,
like LPm and many other examples. But here most of such minimization is done by the two earlier
conditions; this one excludes only specific degenerate cases. We thus obtain the main definition:
models of a graph G (or its theory Γ) are A−
G
-closed, maximal semikernels:
Mod(G) ={S ∈ SK(G) | A−
G
(A−
G
[S]) ⊆ A−
G
[S] ∧ ∀R ⊆ G :
R ∈ SK(G)∧A−
G
(A−
G
[R]) ⊆A−
G
[R]⇒ A−
G
[S] 6⊂ A−
G
[R]}
(3.3)
The consequence relation |= generalizes |=c to 3-partitions αS = 〈α1S , α
0
S , α
⊥
S 〉 = 〈S,A
−
G
(S), G \
A−
G
[S]〉, arising from all independent S ⊆ G, in particular, models of G : Γ |= C if ∀S ∈Mod(G) :
αS |= C. As formulae, we use clauses and let AB denote a clause with atoms A and negated
atoms B. Such a clause is satisfied by a 3-partition α according to the following rule:
〈α1, α0, α⊥〉 |= AB ⇔ A ∩ α1 6= ∅ ∨B ∩ α0 6= ∅ ∨ (AB ⊆ α⊥ 6= ∅). (3.4)
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The third disjunct may appear less intuitive than the first two, but we comment it below. When
α⊥ = ∅, this reduces to the classical satisfaction and consequence with respect to CMod(G), cf.
(2.5). In the extreme case of a Γ where all atoms are involved in inconsistency, there is only one
model 〈∅, ∅, G〉, arising from the empty semikernel, and satisfying every clause (over the atoms G).
On the other hand, the empty theory has the empty graph, with only one, empty kernel, giving
the only model 〈∅, ∅, ∅〉, which does not satisfy any formula. This deviation from classical logic is
only a question of preference, since for this special case we could define the models in the classical
way. However, since our logic is a logic of consequences rather than of tautologies, it appears
plausible that nothing follows from saying nothing.
According to (3.4), an α satisfies a clause C either for some “healthy” reasons, when some
of its literals are true, or because the clause is “completely nonsensical”, with all atoms involved
into inconsistency. In natural discourse, we tend to focus on its meaningful parts, simply ignoring
occasional nonsense. A statement “The sun is a planet; or else this (part of this) statement is
false.” may be judged nonsensical (as it would be in SK or LP, where 0 ∨ ⊥ = ⊥). But if we
grant the interlocutor the benefit of doubt and are willing to ignore the partial nonsense, we can
also say that it is false, since so is its meaningful part. When, however, unable to discern any
sense whatsoever, like in the liar or in (c)-(d)-(e) from (2.2), we “accept” the claim as much as
we “accept” its negation. Relation (3.4) can be read as such an acceptance which treats clauses
containing healthy literals according to these literals, ignoring the nonsensical part. Faced with
a complete nonsense, however, it becomes as confused as we are when, in the face of the liar, we
find it equally (im)plausible to accept its “truth” and its “falsehood”. This does not imply any
semantic dialetheism, since nonsensical atoms are excluded from the healthy considerations and
relegated to α⊥. (They can be seen as gluts, since both the atom and its negation are provable, but
also as gaps, being irrelevant for the value of clauses containing also healthy literals.) A significant
point is that this acceptance relation is not used for defining the models, which are chosen using
(3.3), but only for determining their consequences. As it happens, the members of Mod(G) do
satisfy the graph’s theory according to (3.4), but they need not be all 3-partitions doing this.
Typically,Mod(G) contains nontrivial models also for inconsistent Γ. In fact, these are classical
models of the appropriate subgraph. Given an α1 ∈ Mod(G), and projecting away the third
component from its partition 〈α1, A−
G
(α1), G\A−
G
[α1]〉, leaves 〈α1, A−
G
(α1)〉 ∈ CMod(A−
G
[α1]), i.e.,
α1 ∈ Ker(A−
G
[α1]) – a classical model of the theory for the induced subgraphA−
G
[α1]. Interestingly,
each two of such models α1, β1 ∈ Mod(G) classify the same vertices as inconsistent, assigning
boolean values to the same subset of G, namely, A−
G
[α1] = A−
G
[β1].
Proving this will take the rest of this section and requires some preliminary observations. When
S ∈ SK(G), αS = 〈S,A
−
G
(S), G\A−
G
[S]〉 satisfies conditions (a) and (b) from (2.8), repeated below:
(a) x ∈ α1 ⇒ ∀y ∈ AG(x) : y ∈ α
0 AG(α
1) ⊆ α0
(b) x ∈ α0 ⇔ ∃y ∈ AG(x) : y ∈ α1 α0 = A−G (α
1)
(c) x ∈ α⊥ ⇔ ∀y ∈ AG(x) : y ∈ α
⊥ α⊥ = AG[α
⊥]
(3.5)
Condition (c) in (2.8) was a mere definition of α⊥ = G \ (α1 ∪ α0), while here it expresses that
S is A−
G
-closed, since its complement α⊥ is AG-closed. Obviously, A
−
G
(A−
G
[S]) ⊆ (A−
G
[S]) implies
α⊥S ⊇ AG[α
⊥
S ]. The opposite implication of (c) follows then from (a) and (b), while α
⊥
S ⊆ AG[α
⊥
S ]
holds by definition AG[X ] = X ∪ AG(X). (Unlike in (a) and (b), the two formulations in (c) are
not equivalent.) Hence for every A−
G
-closed S ∈ SK(G), αS satisfies (3.5), and pSK(G) denotes
all such 3-partitions.
Conversely, every 3-partition α ∈ pSK(G) satisfies (2.8), so that α1 ∈ SK(G). Such an α
satisfies also the following closure property:
(i) AG(α
⊥) ⊆ α⊥
(ii) A−
G
(α1 ∪ α0) ⊆ α1 ∪ α0
(3.6)
Point (i) follows from condition (c) of (3.5) while point (ii) is equivalent to (i), since α⊥ =
G \ (α0 ∪ α1). When α1 ∈ SK(G), (ii) is the condition (3.1). Thus pSK partitions correspond
exactly to A−
G
-closed semikernels, (3.1), so that Mod(G) correspond exactly to maximal pSK
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partitions, namely:
α ∈ mpSK(G)⇔ α ∈ pSK(G) ∧ ∀β ∈ pSK(G) : α0 ∪ α1 6⊂ β0 ∪ β1. (3.7)
In addition, the following fact is used in the proof of the next, crucial lemma.
Fact 3.8 For every graph G,
1. If T ⊆ S ∈ SK(G) then (S ∩ A∗
G
(T )) ∈ SK(G).
2. If S ∈ SK(G), T ∈ SK(G) and A−
G
(S) ⊆ G \ T , then (S ∪ T ) ∈ SK(G).
Proof. 1. For any x ∈ AG(t) ⊆ AG(T ) ⊆ AG(S) ⊆ A−G (S), and s ∈ S with x ∈ A
−
G
(s), we have
s ∈ A∗
G
(t) ⊆ A∗
G
(T ), i.e., x ∈ A−
G
(S∩A∗
G
(T )). This gives the first inclusion below, while the second
one follows since S ∈ SK(G):
AG(S ∩A∗G(T )) ⊆ A
−
G
(S ∩ A∗
G
(T )) ⊆ G \ S ⊆ G \ (S ∩ A∗
G
(T )).
2. AG(S∪T ) ⊆ AG(S)∪AG(T ) ⊆ A−G (S)∪A
−
G
(T ) = A−
G
(S∪T ). For the next inclusion, we note that
A−
G
(S) ⊆ G \ T implies here also the dual A−
G
(T ) ⊆ G \ S, for if for some t ∈ T, s ∈ S : t ∈ AG(s),
then t ∈ A−
G
(S) since S ∈ SK(G). Hence
A−
G
(S) ∪A−
G
(T ) ⊆ ((G \ S) ∩ (G \ T )) ∪ ((G \ T ) ∩ (G \ S)) = G \ (S ∪ T ). 
Consequently, distinct A−
G
-closed semikernels, disagreeing on at least one paradoxical element, can
be combined as in the proof of the following lemma.
Lemma 3.9 For all graphs G :
∀α, β ∈ pSK(G) ∃γ ∈ pSK(G) : β1 ∪ β0 6⊆ α1 ∪ α0 ⇒ α1 ∪ α0 ⊂ γ1 ∪ γ0.
Proof. For arbitrary α, β ∈ pSK(G) with β1 ∪ β0 6⊆ α1 ∪ α0, we have that (β1 ∪ β0) ∩ α⊥ 6= ∅,
so define Q = β1 ∩α⊥ and R = β0 ∩α⊥. We show that S = α1 ∪Q, with Q 6= ∅, is an A−
G
-closed
semikernel, i.e., the desired γ1.
(a) R ⊆ AG(Q), by β1 ∈ SK(G) and 3.6.(i) – hence also Q 6= ∅.
(b) A∗
G
(Q) ⊆ A∗
G
(α⊥) ⊆ α⊥, by 3.6.(i).
(c) Q is a semikernel, because β1 ∩ A∗
G
(Q) ∈ SK(G) by Fact 3.8.(1), while Q = β1 ∩A∗
G
(Q) by
(b): β1 ∩ α⊥ ⊆ β1 ∩ A∗
G
(Q) ⊆ β1 ∩ α⊥.
(d) A−
G
(Q) ⊆ G \ α1, by Q ⊆ α⊥ and α1 ∈ SK(G) (so that A−
G
(α⊥) ∩ α1 = ∅).
(e) S ∈ SK(G), by Fact 3.8.(2) (applicable by (c)-(d) above).
(f) S is A−
G
-closed, i.e., A−
G
(A−
G
[S]) ⊆ A−
G
[S]. If x ∈ S ⊆ A−
G
[S], then trivially A−
G
(x) ⊆ A−
G
[S].
If x ∈ A−
G
(S), we have two cases.
(i) x ∈ A−
G
(α1). Since α is a pSK partition, (3.5): A−
G
(x) ∩ α⊥ = ∅. Since G \ A−
G
[S] ⊆
α⊥ : A−
G
(x) ⊆ A−
G
[S], as desired.
(ii) x ∈ A−
G
(Q). α satisfies (3.5) and β (2.8), so A−
G
(Q) ⊆ β0 ∩ (α⊥ ∪ α0).
If x ∈ α0 then A−
G
(x) ⊆ α1 ∪ α0, because α satisfies (3.5). Hence A−
G
(x) ⊆ A−
G
[S]. If
x ∈ β0 ∩ α⊥ then A−
G
(x) ⊆ (β1 ∪ β0) ∩ (α⊥ ∪ α0). For any y ∈ A−
G
(x):
y ∈ (β1 ∪ β0) ∩ α0 ⊆ A−
G
(α1) ⊆ A−
G
(S), or
y ∈ β1 ∩ α⊥ = Q ⊆ A−
G
[S], or
y ∈ β0 ∩ α⊥ – then ∃z ∈ β1 : y ∈ A−
G
(z), since β1 ∈ SK(G). Since z ∈ AG(y), so
z ∈ α⊥ by 3.6.(i), which means that z ∈ Q so that y ∈ A−
G
(Q) ⊆ A−
G
(S).

So, if α, β ∈ mpSK(G) while α⊥ 6= β⊥, then β1 ∪ β0 6= α1 ∪ α0, in particular, β1 ∪ β0 6⊆ α1 ∪ α0
(since ⊂ would contradict (3.7) for β). There is then γ ∈ pSK(G) : α1∪α0 ⊂ γ1∪γ0, contradicting
(3.7) for α. We thus obtain:
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Theorem 3.10 For all graphs G and all S,R ∈Mod(G) : A−
G
[S] = A−
G
[R].
Since every S ∈ SK(G) is a kernel of the subgraph induced by A−
G
[S], our Mod(G) satisfy quite
a strog property: they are namely kernels of one specific subgraph of G, given by A−
G
[S], for any
maximal A−
G
-closed semikernel S. When the theory is consistent, A−
G
[S] = G and Mod(G) =
Ker(G), i.e., the models are exactly the classical ones.
The induced subgraph A−
G
[S], for any S ∈Mod(G), gives the maximal consistent subdiscourse
of G. Since the graph provides the syntax of a theory, a (typically induced) subgraph corresponds
to a kind of subtheory, referred to as a subdiscourse. This concept differs from a subtheory seen as
a subset of the formulae. In the graph D from (2.3), Mod(D) ⊆ Ker(H), where H is the induced
subgraph a′ // aoo boo with the theory T (H) = {b↔ ¬a, a↔ ¬a′, a′ ↔ ¬a}. Its formula b↔ ¬a
does not occur in the original theory ∆ = T (D) from (2.2), which has instead b ↔ ¬a ∧ ¬c. A
subdiscourse, as an induced subgraph, amounts not only to a subset of the formulae but also, for
each retained formula, possibly only a subset of the (negated) atoms under the conjunction in its
right side.
Definition (3.3) chooses as Mod(D) only {a} ∈ Ker(H), making a = 1 and b = 0 = f . The
other kernel {a′, b} ∈ Ker(H) is not a semikernel of D, while the other semikernel {a′} of D is
not A−
D
-closed. The exact subset of kernels of H constituting the models of D can be captured as
the classical models CMod from (2.5) – not, however, of H but of its appropriate modification,
namely, as the kernels of a′
// aoo boo
zz
. The new loop at b keeps track of the edge b→ c, which
disappeared in H but prevents b from being 1. After all, in the original D, b negates c which is
not unproblematically 0. Theorem 4.9 below shows that models of every discourse are exactly the
classical models of such a modification of its maximal consistent subdiscourse.
4 Reasoning
The system RES consists of the axiom ⊢ aa, for every atom a, and the resolution rule,
Γ ⊢ Aa Γ ⊢ Ba
Γ ⊢ AB
.
Clauses are obtained from the two implications of GNF formulae (2.1). For each x ∈ G, they are
of two kinds:
or-clause: x ∨
∨
i∈[nx]
yi, written as xy1y2...yn
nand-clauses: ¬x ∨ ¬yi, for every i ∈ [nx], denoted xyi.
In terms of a graph G, its clausal theory C(G) contains, for every x ∈ G, the or-clause AG[x] =
{x}∪AG(x) and for every y ∈ AG(x), the nand-clause xy. For the graph D from (2.3), its clausal
theory is:
C(D) = {aa′, aa′, bac, ba, bc, cd, cd, de, de, ec, ec}.
We treat clauses as (finite) sets of literals, with overbars marking the negative ones, i.e., we write
AB for a clause with atoms A and negated atoms B. Initial uppercase letters A,B,C... denote
typically arbitrary clauses, which is sometimes marked by C ⊆ G¨, where G¨ = G ∪ {x | x ∈ G}.
For a clause C, C− denotes the set of unary clauses with its complementary literals.
Of primary interest to us are graphs (GNF theories) but several results hold for arbitrary
clausal theories (sets of finite clauses). By “every Γ” we mean such theories. (For graphs, the
axiom schema is not needed, being provable for every vertex with outgoing edges, e.g., in C(D),
resolving bac with ba and bc yields bb, etc.) The following gathers some relevant facts about
resolution:
Fact 4.1 For every Γ over atoms G and a clause C ⊆ G¨ :
1. Γ ⊢ C ⇒ Γ |=c C,
2. CMod(Γ) = ∅ ⇔ Γ ⊢ {},
3. Γ |=c C ⇔ Γ, C− ⊢ {},
4. Γ |=c C ⇔ ∃B ⊆ C : Γ ⊢ B,
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5. Γ ⊢ {} ⇔ ∃a ∈ G : Γ ⊢ a ∧ Γ ⊢ a denoted Γ ⊢ ⊥(a),
6. Denoting RES(Γ) = {C | Γ ⊢ C}:
RES(Γ, A−) = RES(Γ) ∪ A− ∪ {P \B | Γ ⊢ P and B ⊆ A}.
For diagnosing inconsistency of Γ, pinpointing the problem to specific atoms is not necessary, and
it suffices that Γ ⊢ {}, as guaranteed by point 2. This point implies also refutational completeness
with respect to all classical consequences, 3. But we consider instead only direct (not refutational)
derivability, i.e., we ask if Γ ⊢ C, instead of Γ, C− ⊢ {}. This gives weakened completeness,
4, which could be repaired by adding the weakening rule. But its absence, and the consequent
inadmissibility of Ex Falso, arise now as virtues rather than vices. They give a paraconsistent
ability to contain paradox and reason about the subdiscourse unaffected by it.
As a simple example, for Γ = {x, x, s}, we have Γ ⊢ {} but also Γ 6⊢ s. Its graph – x
zz
s
– justifies this: the liar x is in no way “connected” to s. This is the essence of the phenomenon,
which we now describe in more detail.
Example 4.2 The closure of F2 : f
%% // y // s, that is, of its clausal theory Γ2 = {f, fy, ys, ys, s}
contains, besides {}, all literals.
The clausal theory C(D) = {aa′, aa′, bac, ba, bc, cd, cd, de, de, ec, ec} is provably paradoxical, but
neither b, a′ nor a are provable. Its deductive closure contains ⊥(x) for each x ∈ {c, d, e} and,
besides that, only b, a and a′. It determines thus the only member of Mod(D).
This is no coincidence – RES derives clauses satisfied by all Mod(G) and, extended with appro-
priate weakening, exactly these clauses, but proving this will take the rest of this section. First,
we register soundness of RES for all 3-partitions.
Fact 4.3 For every 3-partition α of G, every a ∈ G and A,B ⊆ G¨ :
α |= aa and α |= Aa ∧ α |= Ba⇒ α |= AB.
Proof. Let α = 〈α1, α0, α⊥〉 be an arbitrary 3-partition of G. Obviously, α |= aa, for if
a 6∈ α1 ∪ α0, then a ∈ α⊥. Assume that α |= Aa and α |= Ba. If AB ⊆ α⊥, then α |= AB, also
when AB = {}, since then both α |= a and α |= a, which imply a ∈ α⊥. Assuming AB 6⊆ α⊥,
either A 6⊆ α⊥ or B 6⊆ α⊥. Wlog., assume A 6⊆ α⊥. If B ⊆ α⊥, then a ∈ α0∪α⊥ because α |= Ba.
Then A contains a literal which witnesses to its truth (positive in α1 or negative in α0), and to
the truth of the conclusion. If B 6⊆ α⊥, then either a ∈ α0, and the conclusion follows as in the
previous case, or B contains a literal witnessing to its truth, and to the truth of the conclusion. 
Consequently, our semantics agrees with the classical one as to which theories count as inconsistent
and RES proves inconsistency for exactly these theories:
(a) Γ |= {} ⇔ Γ |=c {}
(b) Γ |= {} ⇔ Γ ⊢ {}.
(a) follows by Γ |=c {} ⇔ CMod(Γ) = ∅
4.1.2
⇒ Γ ⊢ {}
4.3
⇒ Γ |= {}. Conversely, if Γ |= {}
then for every α ∈ Mod(Γ) : α⊥ 6= ∅, i.e., CMod(Γ) = ∅, so Γ |=c {}. Combining (a) with
Γ ⊢ {} ⇔ Γ |=c {} from Fact 4.1.(2) yields (b).
The rest of this section is concerned primarily with the situations when Γ ⊢ {} and ∃x ∈ G : Γ 6⊢
⊥(x). The constructions and results are general, but they trivialize when one of these conditions
is violated. Given an arbitrary Γ, we construct Γok – the maximal consistent subdiscourse, with
the additional requirement on its border vertices, which refer to the inconsistent elements. (Γok is
empty if all atoms are inconsistent and coincides with Γ, if none is.) The classical models of Γok
turn out to be the models of Γ, Theorem 4.9. This leads to the completeness of RES, where every
clause satisfied by allMod(G) has a nonempty provable witness, Corollary 4.11. Augmenting RES
with appropriate weakening yields then a strongly complete reasoning system. Some technicalities
below, originating from [10], are adjusted to the present context and repeated to make the paper
self-contained. The main results, Theorem 4.9 and Corollary 4.11, are new.
For a clausal theory Γ ⊆ P(G¨) and X ⊆ G, the operation
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Γ \\X = {C \ X¨ | C ∈ Γ} \ {{}}
removes all literals over atoms X from all clauses of Γ, removing also the empty clause, if it
appears. It satisfies the following important property, relating consequences of Γ to consequences
of Γ \\X .
Lemma 4.4 For each Γ and A 6⊆ X¨ : Γ ⊢ A⇒ ∃B ⊆ A \ X¨ : Γ \\X ⊢ B.
Proof. If Γ \\X ⊢ {} the claim follows, so we assume that this is not the case and proceed by
induction on the length of the proof Γ ⊢ A, with axioms introducing A \ X¨ instead of A. A step
Γ ⊢ A1a Γ ⊢ A2a
Γ ⊢ A1A2
, where A = A1A2, has by IH the corresponding proofs Γ \\X ⊢ (A1a) \ X¨
and Γ \\X ⊢ (A1a) \ X¨ . If a ∈ X¨ , either of these proofs can serve as the conclusion. Otherwise,
conclusion follows by the deduction
Γ ⊢ (A1 \ X¨)a Γ ⊢ (A2 \ X¨)a
Γ ⊢ A1A2 \ X¨
. 
Hence, if Γ ⊢ C and C contains at least one literal not in X¨ , Then Γ \\X ⊢ C′ for some nonempty
C′ ⊆ C: removing literals from Γ using \\, results at most in sharpening the information about
the remaining atoms. Let us denote:
G⊥ = {x ∈ G | Γ ⊢ x ∧ Γ ⊢ x}
Γok = Γ \\G⊥ = {C \G⊥ | C ∈ Γ} \ {{}}
Gok = G \G⊥ =
⋃
Γok.
G⊥ contains all provably paradoxical atoms, while its complement Gok could be taken as the
atomic extension of the consistency-operator, if we were aiming at a logic of formal inconsistency.
As we will see, it coincides with the domain of the maximal consistent subdiscourse, A−
G
[S], for
any S ∈ Mod(G). For now, we only note that G⊥ is AG-closed, Fact 4.5, and that Γok remains
consistent alongside G⊥ and conservative over Γ with respect to the nonparadoxical atoms Gok,
as made precise by Fact 4.6.
Fact 4.5 For every Γ and x ∈ G : Γ ⊢ ⊥(x)⇒ ∀y ∈ AG(x) : Γ ⊢ ⊥(y).
Proof. Γ ⊢ x and the axiom xyi, for each yi ∈ AG(x), give Γ ⊢ yi. Resolving then xy1...yn with
x and yj , for all j 6= i, gives Γ ⊢ yi for each yi ∈ AG(x). 
Fact 4.6 For Γ with Gok 6= ∅:
1. ∀A ∈ Γok : Γ ⊢ A, so ∀C ⊆ G¨ok : Γok ⊢ C ⇒ Γ ⊢ C.
2. Γok 6⊢ {}.
3. ∀x ∈ Gok : Γok ⊢ x⇔ Γ ⊢ x and Γok ⊢ x⇔ Γ ⊢ x.
4. ∃x ∈ Gok : Γok 6⊢ x, hence also Γ 6⊢ x.
5. ∀x ∈ Gok : Γok 6⊢ x⇒ AG(x) ⊆ Gok (when Γ is a graph).
Proof. 1. Since for each atom a 6∈ Gok, both Γ ⊢ a and Γ ⊢ a, such atoms can be resloved away
from every clause of Γ. Each clause of Γok is obtained exactly by such an operation.
2. Γok ⊢ {}
4.1.5
⇒ ∃x ∈ Gok : Γok ⊢ x ∧ Γok ⊢ x
1.
⇒ Γ ⊢ x ∧ Γ ⊢ x⇒ x 6∈ Gok.
3. Implications to the right follow by point 1, while to the left by Lemma 4.4 and point 2.
4. If ∀x ∈ Gok : Γok ⊢ x, then also ∀y ∈ G : Γ ⊢ y, and then ∀y ∈ G : Γ ⊢ y, contradicting
Gok 6= ∅.
5. If x ∈ Gok has a y ∈ AG(x) ∩G⊥, then Γ ⊢ y ⇒ Γ ⊢ x
3.
⇒ Γok ⊢ x. 
When Γ represents a graph G, Γok is almost the theory of its induced subgraph Gok, except for
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a difference at its border brd(Gok) = {x ∈ Gok | AG(x) 6⊆ Gok}. For instance, for our discourse
D = a′
// aoo boo // c // d // evv :
∆ = {aa′, aa′, bac, ba, bc, cd, cd, de, de, ec, ec}
D⊥ = {c, d, e}
Dok = {a′, a, b} – or the induced subgraph a′ // aoo boo
∆ok = {aa′, aa′, ba, ba, b}
brd(Dok) = {b}
C(Dok) = {aa′, aa′, ba, ba} – clausal theory of the induced subgraph Dok
As in this example so generally, border vertices enter as negative literals into Γok = C(Gok) ∪
(brd(Gok))−, according to Fact 4.6.(5). One can thus view Γok as (the theory of) the subgraph
induced by Gok, with a loop added at each border vertex. It is consistent, Fact 4.6.(2), so its
models are kernels of Gok excluding border vertices:
CMod(Γok) = {L ∈ Ker(Gok) | brd(Gok) ⊆ A−
G
(L)}. (4.7)
These classical models of Γok are actually the models Mod(Γ) from (3.3). To show this, we first
register a preliminary observation.
Fact 4.8 CMod(Γok) ⊆ SK(G).
Proof. Since each L ∈ CMod(Γok) is a kernel of Gok, it is obviously independent in Gok and,
since Gok is an induced subgraph of G (only with additional loops), so L is independent also in
G. Hence A−
G
(L) ⊆ G \ L.
By soundness of RES, if a ∈ L then Γok 6⊢ a, which by Fact 4.6.(5) means that AG(a) ⊆ G
ok,
so that AG(a) = AGok(a) ⊆ A
−
G
ok(L), where the inclusion follows since L ∈ Ker(G
ok). Obviously,
A−
G
ok(L) ⊆ A
−
G
(L). Combining the two yields AG(L) ⊆ A−G (L) ⊆ G \ L, i.e., L ∈ SK(G). 
Writing S |= Γ or S ∈ pSK(G), for an S ∈ SK(G), we mean αS |= Γ or αS ∈ pSK(G), for
αS = 〈S,A−G (S), G \ A
−
G
[S]〉. The bijection in the theorem, CMod(Γok) ≃ Mod(G), means then
A−
G
ok(S) = A
−
G
(S), for relevant S, and
(⊃∼) ∀〈S,A
−
G
(S), G \A−
G
[S]〉 ∈Mod(G) : 〈S,A−
G
(S)〉 ∈ CMod(Gok) and
(⊂∼) ∀〈S,A
−
G
ok(S)〉 ∈ CMod(Γ
ok) : 〈S,A−
G
(S), G \A−
G
[S]〉 ∈Mod(G).
Theorem 4.9 For every theory Γ with graph G : CMod(Γok) ≃Mod(G).
Proof. (⊃∼). follows using Fact 4.3 but first we show that (1a) if S ∈Mod(G) then S |= Γ. This
and (1b) hold actually for every S ∈ pSK(G):
(1a) S ∈ pSK(G)⇒ S |= Γ. For each y ∈ AG(x), i.e., xy, we have one of four cases, each yielding
S |= xy:
(i) y ∈ S ⇒ x ∈ A−
G
(S),
(ii) x ∈ S ⇒ y 6∈ S and, since S ∈ SK(G), y ∈ A−
G
(S),
(iii) x ∈ A−
G
(S) or y ∈ A−
G
(S),
(iv) {x, y} ⊆ G \A−
G
[S].
For each AG[x] = {x} ∪ Y , we have one of five cases, each giving S |= AG[x]:
(i) ∃y ∈ Y : y ∈ S,
(ii) x ∈ S,
(iii) x ∈ A−
G
(S)→ ∃y ∈ Y : y ∈ S,
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(iv) ∃y ∈ Y : y ∈ A−
G
(S), since S ∈ pSK(G), so x ∈ A−
G
[S] and S |= AG[x] by (ii) or (iii),
(v) AG[x] ⊆ G \A−G [S].
(1b) ∀S ∈ pSK(G) : Γ ⊢ ⊥(x)⇒ x 6∈ A−
G
[S].
By (1a) S ∈ pSK(G)⇒ S |= Γ so, by soundness Fact 4.3, for any clause C : Γ ⊢ C ⇒ S |= C.
Hence, Γ ⊢ ⊥(x)⇒ S |= ⊥(x), i.e., x ∈ G \A−
G
[S].
(1c) We show that S ∈ Mod(G) satisfies (4.7). By Fact 4.6.(2), Γok 6⊢ {} so, by Fact 4.1.(2),
there is some K ∈ Ker(Gok), i.e., one with A−
G
[K] = Gok. By (2a-b) below, K ∈ pSK(G); since
S ∈ mpSK(G) (as S ∈Mod(G) and (3.7)), so A−
G
[S] ⊇ A−
G
[K] = Gok. By (1b), x ∈ A−
G
[S]⇒ x 6∈
G⊥ ⇒ x ∈ Gok, i.e., A−
G
[S] ⊆ Gok, so that A−
G
[S] = Gok. By (3.6), A−
G
(Gok) ⊆ Gok, so since Gok
is induced subgraph of G : A−
G
ok (S) = A
−
G
(S) and then, since S ∩ A−
G
(S) = ∅ as S ∈ SK(G), so
A−
G
ok(S) = G
ok \ S – showing that S ∈ Ker(Gok).
If x ∈ brd(Gok) then Γ ⊢ x, so S |= x, i.e., x 6∈ S and, since S ∈ Ker(Gok) : x ∈ Gok \ S =
A−
G
[S] \ S = A−
G
(S). Thus brd(Gok) ⊆ A−
G
(S).
(⊂∼). (2a) CMod(Γ
ok) ⊆ SK(G) is Fact 4.8.
(2b) By Fact 4.5, Γ ⊢ ⊥(x) ⇒ ∀y ∈ AG(x) : Γ ⊢ ⊥(y), so AG(G⊥) ⊆ G⊥. Hence A−G (G \G
⊥) ⊆
(G \G⊥), i.e., A−
G
(Gok) ⊆ Gok and so
A−
G
(A−
G
[Gok]) = A−
G
(A−
G
(Gok) ∪Gok)
= A−
G
(A−
G
(Gok)) ∪ A−
G
(Gok) ⊆ A−
G
(Gok) ∪Gok = A−
G
[Gok].
(2c) When S ∈ Ker(Gok) then A−
G
[S] = Gok and S ∈ pSK(G), by (2a-b). If S 6∈ mpSK(G),
i.e., ∃R ∈ pSK(G) : A−
G
[R] 6⊆ A−
G
[S], Lemma 3.9 yields a strict extension A−
G
[Q] ⊃ A−
G
[S]. This
requires adding some E ⊆ G⊥, but by (1b) no e ∈ E can belong to any A−
G
[Q] with Q ∈ pSK(G),
since Γ ⊢ ⊥(e). 
The theorem implies that 〈α1, α0, α⊥〉 ∈ Mod(G) iff 〈α1, α0〉 ∈ CMod(Γok), giving the middle
equality: G \ α⊥ = α1 ∪ α0 = Gok = G \G⊥, which yields:
∀α ∈Mod(G) : α⊥ = G⊥. (4.10)
Thus RES proves both a and a exactly for the atoms a falling outside the healthy, boolean domain
of every model. The following completeness of RES for |= is the counterpart of its classical
completeness for |=c from Fact 4.1.(4).
Corollary 4.11 For every Γ and clause A ⊆ G¨ :
Γ |= A ⇐⇒ A ⊆ G⊥ 6= ∅ or ∃B 6= {} : B ⊆ A ∩ G¨ok ∧ Γ ⊢ B.
Proof. ⇒) Assume that Γ |= A. If A ⊆ G¨⊥ then G⊥ 6= ∅ by (3.4) and we are done. If A 6⊆ G¨⊥,
i.e., C = A \ G¨⊥ 6= ∅, then C ⊆ A ∩ G¨ok and, by (3.4), Γ |= C (since ∀α ∈Mod(Γ) : G⊥ = α⊥ by
(4.10)). Hence, by Theorem 4.9, Γok |=c C which, by Fact 4.1.(4), implies ∃B ⊆ C : Γok ⊢ B. By
Fact 4.6.(2), B 6= {}, while by 4.6.(1), Γ ⊢ B, yielding the conclusion, since B ⊆ A ∩ G¨ok.
⇐) If A ⊆ G⊥ 6= ∅ then Γ |= A directly by (3.4). Otherwise, as Γ ⊢ B so Γ |= B by Fact 4.3.
Since ∅ 6= B ⊆ A ∩ G¨ok, so Γ |= A by (3.4). 
Comparison with Fact 4.1.(4) shows that while in classical logic {} witnesses to every clause by
Ex Falso, in our logic all consequences of a theory have nonempty provable witnesses: Γ |= {} iff
G⊥ 6= ∅, i.e., ∃x : Γ ⊢ x and Γ ⊢ x, while Γ |= A 6= {} is witnessed only by a proof from Γ of either
⊥(a), for all a ∈ A, or of some nonempty subclause B ⊆ A.
The implication to the left in Corollary 4.11 specifies more closely the patterns of weakening
admisible in our logic. Not only Ex Falso is excluded, but weakening has to preserve, so to say, the
reason of satisfaction of its premise. The first case (right-to-left implication from the first disjunct
in Corollary 4.11) allows to weaken the empty clause only to a disjunction of literals involved in
inconsistency, reflecting the irrelevance of the empty clause for the consistent subdiscourse. The
second case ensures that the resulting A contains a healthy (i.e., not involving any paradox)B ⊆ A
witnessing to its satisfaction. Thus, adding to RES either both (aW) and (bW) or only (cW)
(aW )
Γ ⊢ B
Γ ⊢ B ∪ C
B 6⊆ G¨⊥ (bW )
Γ ⊢ ⊥(a) ∀a ∈ A 6= ∅
Γ ⊢ A
(cW )
Γ ⊢ B
Γ ⊢ B ∪C
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yields a sound and strongly complete system for classical logic, with (cW), or for our paraconsistent
logic, with (aW) and (bW). For consistent Γ, the two coincide. Since G⊥ = ∅, (bW) is inapplicable,
while (aW) becomes exactly (cW), since then every B 6⊆ G⊥.
The conditions of (aW) and (bW), reflecting the right side of Corollary 4.11, prevent un-
controlled mixing of consistent and inconsistent elements. As an example, consider the usual
derivation of Lewis’ “paradox”, recasting Ex Falso using disjunctive syllogism. Assuming Γ ⊢ a
and Γ ⊢ a, we have
Γ ⊢ a
Γ ⊢ ab
(cW )
Γ ⊢ a
Γ ⊢ b
(DS)
The step (DS) is an instance of resolution, but since {a} ⊆ G⊥, (aW) can not be applied instead
of (cW).
5 A remark on relevance
Rule (aW) is not very effective, requiring to find b ∈ B for which b or b is not provable, while rule
(bW) joins nonsensical premises into a nonsensical disjunction. These rules, extending RES to a
strongly complete system, provoke also the question: what do we lose by dropping them? RES
remains complete in the sense of Corollary 4.11; if a ∨ b is a consequence of our theory, we may
be able to prove a, but not necessarily a ∨ b. Is it such a loss? If we know that a is true, it is not
particularly enlightening that so is a ∨ b. In this way, the tautology ¬a ∨ a can be diluted to, say,
(i) ¬a ∨ a ∨ ¬b.
With implication x → y defined as ¬x ∨ y, (i) represents some fallacies of relevance, typical
for material implication, e.g., a → (b → a) and ¬a → (a → ¬b), for strict implication, e.g.,
b→ (a→ a) or b→ (¬a ∨ a), or for the intutionistic one, ¬(a→ a)→ b. RES is immune against
such fallacies, which arise in the language of clauses from disjunctive weakening. Note that while
this rule may be indispensable in various systems of Gentzen or natural deduction, in RES it is
not, since here its only contribution is dilution of provable facts. Dropping all forms of weakening,
we lose such diluted consequences, but gain relevance, simplifying reasoning at the same time.
The following remarks elaborate these gains. Without aiming at a logic of relevance, they only
identify its elements in the present setting.
Let us first note that the language of clauses, viewed as sets of literals, identifies, for instance,
a → (a → b) and a → b, representing both as ab and enforcing their equivalence. One could
see it as an unfortunate equivocation but, with the present semantics, it only eliminates spurious
syntax.4
The absence of weakening prevents RES from deriving, besides fallacies exemplified above, also
some other problematic implications, for instance, (a → b) ∧ (c → d) 6⊢ (a → d) ∨ (c → b). From
the assumption, represented by the clauses ab, cd, nothing follows by resolution, in particular, not
the undesired conclusion, adcb, which only weakens either premise.
RES enjoys a specifically relevant form of deduction theorem. If Γ, x ⊢ y, it does not follow
that Γ ⊢ x → y, i.e., Γ ⊢ xy, without further ado. It may namely happen that Γ ⊢ y without
using x, and Γ 6⊢ xy. By Fact 4.1.(6), however, if the proof Γ, x ⊢ y requires x, that is, Γ 6⊢ y, then
indeed Γ ⊢ xy.
Just as our logic is concerned with consequences of a given theory rather than with tautologies,
relevance is judged relatively to the actual context. From some Γ, (i) may be provable and from
others it may not be. For instance
4RES with this language can be seen as a restriction of RMI∼
+
with the usual sequential syntax, from [1]. The
equivalence of RMI∼
+
and RMI∼
→
shows that the former’s disjunction (specializing to ours in the present context)
yields in the latter a satisfactory relevant implication, defined by A → B = ¬A ∨ B. To handle subtler aspects of
relevant implication, such an extension of the syntax and RES, along with the associated semantic adjustments,
might be needed.
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(i1) Γ1 ⊢ cab and Γ1 ⊢ aab, where G1 = ...c← a→ d→ b..., while
(i2) Γ2 ⊢ aa but Γ2 6⊢ aab, where G2 = ...c← a d→ b...,
where “...” indicates a surrounding graph, in which a and d have no incident edges except the
indicated ones. The graph syntax makes explicit the reference structure, allowing to read an edge
x → y as x “referring to” y, by negating y. Reference involves relevance, so that y, negated by
x, is relevant for x. The atoms reachable by arbitrary paths from a given x are then indirect
references, relevant for x. This form of relevance is thus transitive, but context dependence and
the graph syntax justify this fact. In (i1), b is relevant for a, because of their connection through
d. Making b = 0, forces a = 0. This notion, involving only context dependent interaction between
some truth-values of b and a, deviates from those attempting to capture some general meaning-
connections, for instance, by variable-sharing. The two facts in “Water freezes or temperature
is above 0◦C” do not share any variable but are connected by the background knowledge. The
meaning-connections, already between atomic facts, are defined by the context Γ and reflected by
its undiluted consequences. Provability of aab in (i1) suggests such a connection of b and a, while
its unprovability in (i2) witnesses to its absence.
Relevance is more than reference – typically, it is symmetric. In our case, this amounts to
following the paths also in the direction opposite to the edges:
(a) This and the next statmenet are false. a↔ ¬a ∧ ¬b
(b) The next statmenet is false. b↔ ¬c
(c) The previous statmenet is false. c↔ ¬b
a dd

b

c
WW
In the only model, b = 1 and a = c = 0. But if we remove the loop at a, there will be also another
model with a = c = 1 and b = 0. One could say that the loop at a forces b = 1, since otherwise
inconsistency would arise. Not only b, to which a refers, is relevant for a, but also a is relevant
for b, forcing it to be true. In this sense, all “connections” – paths in the underlying graph (the
undirected graph, obtained by forgetting directions of the edges) – mark potential relevance. It is
thus both symmetric and transitive, so its horizon for an atom x is the strong component of the
underlying graph, containing x. Indeed, RES proves some clause with literals over atoms x and y
if and only if x and y belong to one such component.5
Still, this notion of relevance is too weak, as exemplified by the clause aab from (i1). Signaling
a connection between a and b, it does not impose any dependencies between the truth-values of
a, b and the whole clause. Its proof in RES is not a mere dilution of aa, but the clause itself is
such a dilution, which is always true because so is its subclause aa. The sense of relevance should
preclude us from saying such things which, even if true, do not add anything to something which
is already said more concisely.
Let us therefore consider a clause C relevant, in a given context Γ, denoted Γ |=r C, if Γ |= C
and for each nonempty B ⊂ C : Γ 6|= B. For unhealthy atoms, such relevant clauses are the
units a and a, and no other relevant clause contains such atoms. This reminds, once more, of
the irrelevance of meaningless/inconsistent elements for the healthy part of a discourse. For each
2-partition C = AB of a nonunit clause C (with at least two literals), we can write Γ |= C as
Γ |=
∧
A− →
∨
B. If Γ |=r C, this implication is not satisfied, so to say, vacuously, by Γ having
no models satisfying
∧
A−, but by Γ having such models, all satisfying also
∨
B. A relevant C
witnesses thus to the influence, which some truth-values of any nonempty proper subclause A ⊂ C
have for its complement B = C \A: whenever
∧
A− = 1, then
∨
B = 1, and there are cases when∧
A− = 1. This last proviso is the element of relevance. The relation is obviously symmetric: if∧
A− →
∨
B, then also
∧
B− →
∨
A.
This is a much stronger notion than mere membership in the same component of the underlying
graph. In the example (i1), Γ1 6|=r aab since aa ⊆ aab, so the fact that Γ1 |= aab does not imply
5Distinct strong components have disjoint alphabets, with no axiomatic clauses containing literals from both;
hence no provable clause can contain literals from both. Conversely, if there is a path 〈x1, x2, ..., xn〉 in the
underlying graph, then for each pair xi, xi+1, 1 ≤ i < n, there is a negtive clause Ni = xixi+1 and a positive one
Pi = ...xixi+1.... Resolving P1 with N2 yields a clause C3 containing x1 and x3. Resolving C3 with P3 gives C4
containing x1 and x4. A clause Cn, obtained after n− 2 steps, contains x1 and either xn or xn.
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relevance in this strong sense. On the other hand, Γ1 ⊢ ab and Γ1 |=r ab, so a and b are relevant
for each other: Γ1 has then models with b = 0, in which a = 0, and models with a = 1, in which
b = 1. If Γ1 6|=r ab then a and b would cease to be mutually relevant, since then either Γ1 |= a or
Γ |=r b, irrespectively of each other.
This relevance relation is not transitive. In G = ...d aoo // b //
**
c... e...
(with appropriate assumptions about the undisplayed part, e.g., all ... starting mutually disjoint
infinite paths), b is relevant for a, since Γ |=r ab, and c is relevant for b since Γ |=r bc. But c is
no longer relevant for a, because any value at c can be accompanied by any value at a. However,
c ∨ e is relevant for a, since Γ |=r ace.
The relevant clauses are exactly the minimal provable ones: 6
Min(Γ) = {C | Γ ⊢ C ∧ ∀B ⊂ C : B 6= {} ⇒ Γ 6⊢ B}
= {C | Γok ⊢ C ∧ ∀B ⊂ C : Γok 6⊢ B} ∪
⋃
{{a, a} | Γ ⊢ ⊥(a)}.
Thus each RES provable clause C represents a form of relevance. Even if C 6∈ Min(Γ), all its
atoms belong to one component of the underlying graph and, moreover, there is some nonempty
D ⊂ C with D ∈ Min(Γ), witnessing to the determination – in some occurring cases – of the
truth-value of one part of each 2-partition of D by the truth-value of the other.
References
[1] Arnon Avron. Relevance nad paraconsistency – a new approach, part II: the formal systems.
Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 31(2):169–202, 1990.
[2] Timo Beringer and Thomas Schindler. Graph-theoretic analysis of semantic paradoxes. The
Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, 23(4):442–492, 2017.
[3] Marc Bezem, Clemens Grabmayer, and Michal Walicki. Expressive power of digraph solv-
ability. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic, 163(3):200–212, 2012.
[4] Roy Cook. Patterns of paradox. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 69(3):767–774, 2004.
[5] Phan Minh Dung. On the acceptability of arguments and its fundamental role in nonmono-
tonic reasoning, logic programming and n-person games. Artificial Intelligence, 77:321–357,
1995.
[6] Sjur Dyrkolbotn and Michal Walicki. Propositional discourse logic. Synthese, 191(5):863–899,
2014.
[7] Tjeerd B. Jongeling, Teun Koetsier, and Evert Wattel. Self-reference in finite and infinite
paradoxes. Logique & Analyse, 177-178, 2002.
[8] Victor Neumann-Lara. Seminu´cleos de una digra´fica. Technical report, Anales del Instituto
de Matema´ticas II, Universidad Nacional Auto´noma Me´xico, 1971.
[9] Landon Rabern, Brian Rabern, and Matthew Macauley. Dangerous reference graphs and
semantic paradoxes. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 42:727–765, 2013.
[10] Michal Walicki. Resolving infinitary paradoxes. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 82(2):709–723,
2017.
[11] Michal Walicki. Kernels of digraphs with finitely many ends. Discrete Mathematics, 342:473–
486, 2019.
6First, for each nonunit clause C ∈Min(Γ) and nonempty B ⊂ C : Γok, B− 6⊢ {}. This follows because, by Fact
4.6.(2), Γok 6⊢ {} and then, by Fact 4.1.(6), Γok, B− 6⊢ {} iff ∀E ⊆ B : Γok 6⊢ E, which holds since C ∈ Min(Γ).
The main claim is trivial for unit clauses. Assuming now a nonunit AB = C ∈ Min(Γ), the observation above
implies existence of a classical model of Γok (i.e., a model of Γ), satisfying B−, so that Γ 6|= B. Since Γok ⊢ C, so
Γ ⊢ C by Fact 4.6.(1), and hence Γ |= C by soundness. So C ∈ Min(Γ) ⇒ Γ |=r C. Conversely, if for a nonunit
C : Γ |=r C, then C ∩ G¨⊥ = ∅, so that Γok |=c C. Then Γok ⊢ B for some B ⊆ C by Fact 4.6.(4). But since Γ 6|= B,
for every B ⊂ C so, by soudness, Γ 6⊢ B, and hence Γok 6⊢ B by 4.6.(1), so Γok ⊢ C and C ∈ Min(Γ).
14
